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GENERAL COMMENTS 
"Old wine in new bottles" has been used to describe Article 3 
on commercial paper. Perhaps this description is more aptly ap-
plied to the commercial paper provisions than to other articles of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, for the substantive changes in the 
law of negotiable instruments are not extensive. 
Usually, the practicing attorney's loudest lament about any 
statutory change in existing law is that he must unlearn much of 
what he already has mastered. This attitude is based on the assump-
tion that he has a mastery of the subject being tampered with by 
legislation. In the area of commercial paper, however, it is sub-
mitted that most practitioners have probably become somewhat rusty 
on the refinements of existing law. Such a waning of knowledge is 
understandable, for so many legal problems associated with negotia-
ble instruments are resolved in out-of-court settlements, by default 
judgments, or by a simple failure of holders of "bad paper" to seek 
legal advice. The fact that only about a dozen negotiable instru-
ment cases have reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
since 1952 is some indication of the paucity of complicated litigation 
on the matter.1 
* Member of the Virginia Bar and Lecturer in Law at the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary; consultant to 
North Carolina Legislative Council for Articles 3, 4 and 5. 
1 The scarcity of appellate cases could be considered as an indication 
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Since the typical reader probably is not conversant with the 
existing law of negotiable instruments, he most likely will view 
North Carolina's passage of Article 3 not as a threat to his usual 
way of doing things but as an opportunity to review briefly a few 
somewhat basic rules relating to negotiable instruments in general. 
The following commentary is based on this premise. 
Though discussion is primarily of basic law, a few comments 
will be made on more refined problems for the benefit of readers 
interested in the esoteric. Also, an occasional suggestion will be 
made for further legislative action that might facilitate collections 
of negotiable instruments. 
!. THE GENERAL NATURE OF ARTICLE 3 
Generally, Article 3 is a revision of the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Law-2 promulgated by the National Conference on Uni-
form State Laws in 1896 and promptly adopted by North Carolina 
in 1899. Though the NIL had been adopted in every state by 1925, 
the desired uniformity of law did not materialize in practice. Many 
states modified by legislative action various statutory provisions, 
and some eighty of the NIL's 198 sections have received conflicting 
constructions by the courts. 
Briefly stated, the general purposes of Article 3 are: 
( 1) to reconcile prior inconsistencies by adopting in statutory 
form the "best" view of the courts; 
(2) to eliminate obsolete provisions of the NIL; 
(3) to consolidate the prolix 198 sections of the NIL into 
seventy-nine revised sections under Article 3 ; 
( 4) to narrow the scope of the provisions by eliminating from 
coverage under the modified rules of the NIL certain instruments 
that were previously lumped in with commercial paper to form a 
nebulous hodgepodge of paper called negotiable instruments; and 
( 5) to leave to the coverage of Article 4 (bank deposits and 
collections) certain specific rules on commercial paper when such 
paper is involved in the banking process and the bank-customer 
relationship. 
that the law of North Carolina is well settled in matters affecting negotiable 
instruments. However, the frequency with which other apparently well-
settled matters are appealed argues for the minimum litigation conclusion. 
2 Hereinafter referred to as the NIL. 
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It is appropriate to note that the lawyer's research task will be 
immeasurably facilitated by Article 3. While the seventy-nine Code 
sections and comments thereon may not answer all questions, they 
do give a sound starting point that is far superior to prior statutory 
law with its multiple views (views often prompted by insignificant 
peculiarities of the facts which made a particular construction ex-
pedient at the time). The law will surely be easier to find, at least 
until we again develop a body of new conflicting constructions. 
In particular, attention is called to the official comments in the 
1962 official text of the Code and the North. Carolina comments 
compiled for the Legislative Council. While these comments are 
not law in themselves, they do set forth changes from prior law, 
and in some instan,ces the exact meaning of rather concise statutory 
provisions can be determined only by a careful study of the 1962 
official comments. 
A cautionary word is added here. This writer must take the 
responsibility for the North Carolina comments to Articles 3, 4 and 
5, and because of the haste necessary in their preparation they 
should not be taken as either definitive or final. 
In reading the official text and the official comments to the 
Code, the reader is forewarned that punctuation is at a minimum. 
Clarity at times is achieved by mentally adding an occasional comma 
or semicolon. Also, some sections can be better understood by read-
ing the concluding sentences first. As one wag at a recent meeting 
put it, "and it sometimes helps to not only reverse the sentence 
order, but to read each sentence backwards." Though this is an 
obvious overstatement, one may gain new insight into many sections 
by experimenting with some rearrangement of words. 
II. THE ScoPE oF ARTICLE 3 
Item ( 4) of the purposes listed above notes that the scope of 
Article 3 covering commercial paper is narrower than the existing 
coverage of the NIL. This narrowing of coverage is of considerable 
importance, and a bit of history will give the proper perspective for 
appreciating more fully the "labeling technique" employed in the 
past and under the Code. 
Fundamentally, a negotiable paper is a species of contract having 
legal attributes quite different from other contracts. For example, 
the so-called "negotiable instrument" was one that could be assigned 
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(or negotiated) at a time when the common law frowned on the 
assignment of contract rights. Further, the transfer of such paper 
could be accomplished with relative ease, i.e., by mere delivery in 
the case of bearer paper or . an indorsement plus a delivery in the 
case of order paper. Also, a subsequent good faith purchaser could 
collect on the contract free of defenses existing between prior parties, 
this being the subsequent owner's main advantage in being classi-
fied as a holder in due course. In addition to the ease-of-transfer 
and freedom-from-defense attributes of a negotiable instrument, such 
an instrument occasionally ·has minor advantages such as ease of 
procedure in suit, more liberal rules on interest allowance, and long-
er periods of limitations. 
In the following analysis a distinction must be made between 
a contract that is negotiable in the sense that it can be easily 
negotiated free of defenses, a technical "negotiable instrument," as 
that term is used in the NIL, and "a negotiable instrument within 
this article," as the term is employed in Article 3. Distinctions 
between these three classes of instruments will be made more ap-
parent in later paragraphs. 
Prior to the NIL, the laws of non-money negotiable instruments 
and the laws of moneyed negotiable instruments were somewhat 
different, but they did have the basic similarity of ease of transfer 
and freedom from certain defenses when sued on by a bona fide 
purchaser. 
When the English codified the law of moneyed paper in the Bills 
of Exchange Act in 1882, they carefully distinguished between 
moneyed and non-moneyed instruments by providing, "Bills, notes 
and checks in order to be negotiable ... must be payable in money." 
Thus, moneyed paper, (bills, notes and checks), had a special law 
of "negotiable instruments" ; but non-moneyed paper could be nego-
tiable apart from the Bills of Exchange Act. 
Later in the century, when the basic rules of the Bills of Ex-
change Act were adopted by John J. Crawford in his draft of the 
NIL, section 13 awkwardly stated, "an instrument to be negotia-
ble ... (2) must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay 
a sum certain in money." This "an instrument" phraseology has 
been descriptively called "Crawford's Blunder," because non-
moneyed paper, such as stocks, interim receipts, warehouse receipts, 
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7 (1953). 
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and bills of lading that had previously been capable of easy transfer 
and freedom from defenses did not meet the "in money" test so as to 
be negotiable under the NIL. 
The legislatures set to work passing statutes such as the Uni-
form Bills of Exchange Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 
the Uniform Interim Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act in order to give back to non-moneyed papers the ancient 
attributes of negotiable paper that the NIL already gave to paper 
payable in money. 
One class of paper that clearly could come under the NIL's "in 
money" requirement is the corporate bond, and for years the nego-
tiability of such investment paper was tested by the detailed defini-
tion of a "negotiable instrument" contained in NIL sections 1 through 
10.4 Often, one or more of the usually elaborate provisions of a 
corporate bond would cause such bond to fail the tests for nego-
tiability. At times, however, the courts stretched the NIL definition 
of a negotiable instrument or construed the terms of the bond in 
such a manner as to permit it to be classified as a "negotiable in-
strument" so as to bring into play the beneficial provisions of that 
law. 
The bond cases are typical of the "classification technique" so 
frequently applied by courts and legislatures. For example, instead 
of asking whether an innocent purchaser for value of a bearer bond 
should be able to hold the bond free of the claims of a prior owner 
from whom it has been stolen, the courts tend to become embroiled 
in the secondary question of whether some one of the provisions 
inserted by the corporate issuer happened not to meet the test of 
a "negotiable instrument" laid down by the NIL. 
Under the classification technique, if the bond is classified as a 
"negotiable instrument," the innocent purchaser for value may be 
a holder in due course (hereinafter called an HDC) free from 
claims of the original true owner. Conversely, if the bond fails the 
NIL test, the same equally innocent purchaser for value is not an 
HDC. Consequently, he is subject to the claim of the prior owner 
under the bromide that "a thief cannot pass title," or the more 
picturesque "title, like a stream, can rise no higher than its source." 
While there is a place for such conclusions, they are not really very 
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-7 to -16 (1953). 
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helpful in ·deciding who has the better claim to paper that is de-
signed to circulate freely in a Wall Street. world. 
Fortunately for the investor, corporate bonds are no longer 
lumped together with bills, notes and checks under Article 3.5 In-
stead such investment paper is covered by Code Article 8 on invest-
ment securities. Other types of negotiable paper are covered by 
Article 5 (letters of credit) and Article 7 (warehouse receipts, 
bills of lading, and other documents of title). 
In ·summary, then, Article 3 is left to cover only drafts, checks, 
certificates of deposit and notes. These items are described as com-
mercial paper,6 from which the article derives its title. 
Turning again to the "labeling game," we find an interesting 
new phrase appearing in Code section 3-104( 1) : "Any writing to be 
a negotiable instrument within this article must .... 117 Here in the 
very first substantive section, we find the "old wine," the familiar, 
though troublesome, terminology. Even Article 3 with its new name 
"Commercial Paper"8 continues to call the paper it governs "a nego-
tiable instrument." However, it limits this to "within this Article." 
The significance is seen in the official comment: "'within this arti-
cle' in subsection ( 1) leaves open the possibility that some writings 
may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial decision. 
The same is true as to any new type of paper which commercial 
practice may develop in the future." 9 Consequently, it now appears 
that in the future the lawyer will be dealing with different kinds 
of negotiable or quasi-negotiable paper: 
( 1) Moneyed or commercial paper that meets the definition 
of «a negotiable instrument within this article," which will be 
governed by the express terms of Article 3. 
(2) Quasi-negotiable paper in the form of documents of title 
to be governed by Article 7. 
( 3) Quasi-negotiable paper in the form of investment securi-
ties covered by Article 8. 
( 4) Other court-sanctioned negotiable paper to be governed 
by some none-too-certain law. 
5 G.S. § 25-3-103(1) provides: "This article does not apply to money, 
documents of title or investment securities." 
• See G.S. § 25-3-104, comment 1. 
7 Emphasis added. 
• Interestingly, the term "commercial paper" is only generally defined in 
G.S. § 25-3-101, comment 1, and it is not defined in the Code proper. 
9 G.S. § 25-3-104(1), comment 1. 
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For the last type of paper, the courts revert to the rules of the 
law merchant.10 However, it is suggested that the courts adopt as 
a part of the decisional law of North Carolina the views expressed 
in the Code provisions if they are deciding a question involving an 
instrument that is for practical purposes the equivalent of "a nego-
tiable instrument within this article." 
One such instrument might have been a check that omits the 
magic words of negotiability-"order" or "bearer." Technically, 
such a check does not come within the definition of Code section 
3-104. However, it is not necessary to speculate whether such a 
check should be treated by decisional law in approximately the same 
way as a technically perfect "negotiable instrument within this arti-
cle." Such check or similar instrument is expressly made subject to 
all provisions of Article 3, except that there can be no holder in 
due course of such instrument.11 For the past year or so counter-
checks omitting the words "order" or "bearer" have been in use 
in North Carolina.12 
Before moving to an analysis of individual provisions of Article 
3, it is important to note the intimate relationship between it and 
Article 4 (bank collections and deposits). 
Whenever commercial paper covered by Article 3 finds its way 
into the bank deposit and collection process, it is necessary to con-
sider both Articles 3 and 4. To the extent of any conflict between 
the two, the specific provisions of Article 4 prevail over the more 
general provisions of Article 3.13 
The close relationship between Articles 3 and 4, however, does 
not necessarily mean that every moneyed paper that gets into the 
hands of a bank will be subject to both articles. For example, Arti-
cle 4 applies to moneyed paper that may not be a negotiable instru-
ment within the definition of Code section 3-104. Also, some com-
mercial paper covered by Article 3 may be in the hands of a bank 
other than as a part of the deposit and collection process. In this 
latter case, only the rules of Article 3 apply. 
•• G.S. § 25-1-103 permits the law merchant to be followed unless dis-
placed by some provision of chapter 25 of the General Statutes. 
11 G.S. § 25-3-805. 
12 The presence of such checks may be explained by the fact that one 
of the companies printing checks for North Carolina users is located in 
Georgia, which adopted the Code several years ago. 
18 G.S. §§ 25-3-103(2), -4-102(1). 
1966] COMMERCIAL PAPER 
SUMMARY OF CODE PROVISIONS 
605 
A full section-by-section commentary is not possible within the 
space alloted, and any comprehensive commentary would be, to a 
large extent, merely repetitive of the Article 3 provisions, the offi-
cial comments, and the North Carolina comments, all of which fill 
about 122 tightly packed pages in newly published Volume 1D of 
The General Statutes of North Carolina. For those who wish to 
pursue a matter not considered here, the pocket supplement to the 
volume offers a useful index tool not available in the Official Uni-
form Commercial Code volume published by the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws. Over five pages of the pocket index to Volume 
1D is devoted to "commercial paper." 
The succeeding commentary follows a straight progression 
through some of the more significant provisions of Article 3. Only 
those sections containing significant changes in existing negotiable 
instrument law are discussed at length, but o~ission of discussion 
of a section does not necessarily mean that it contains no modifica-
tions to existing law. 
I. FoRM AND INTERPRETATION 
Section 25-3-102. Definitions and Index of Definitions.-This 
section not only gives definitions and .citations to other definitions 
in the related Articles 3 and 4 but also provides in subsection ( 4) 
that the general definitions and principles of construction of Article 
1 are applicable to Article 3. 
The principle change here relates to the permissibility of using 
alternative drawees. NIL section 12814 did not permit an order to 
be addressed to two or more drawees in the alternative. The Code 
permits this, thus recognizing current commercial practice whereby 
corporations ·issuing dividend checks (and certain other drawers) 
name a number of drawee banks (often in different parts of the 
-country): 16 
Section 25-3-103. Limitations on Scope of Article.-As pre-
viously observed, this section limits the application of Article 3 to 
checks, drafts, promissory notes, and certificates of deposit. Other 
typ"es of ·paper are governed by other articles. 
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-135 (1953). 
15 Also, subsection (1) (a) makes it clear that a remitter can take. G.S. § 
25-3-102, comment 1. 
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Section 25-3-104. Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft''; 
"Check"; "Certificate of Deposit"; "Note."-The full text of this 
fundamental statute should be studied, because only if the instru-
ment in question meets this definition does Article 3 come into 
play.16 The definition of a "negotiable instrument within this Arti-
cle" is set forth in subsection ( 1) (a). This definition is substantial-
ly the same as the definition of a "negotiable instrument" under 
NIL section 1.17 A full comprehension of the general definition can 
be attained only by a further examination of sections 25-3-105 (on 
"unconditional promise or order") ; -3-106 (on "sum certain") ; 
-3-107 (on "in money"); -3-108 (on "on demand"); -3-109 (on 
"at a definite time"); -3-110 (on "to order"); -3-111 (on "to 
bearer") ; and -3-112 (on additional promises, orders, obligations 
or powers which can be included without killing negotiability under 
Article 3). 
An examination of the above list together with the definition in 
subsection ( 1) (b) of section 25-3-104 reveals that the full tests for 
determining whether a particular instrument is a negotiable instru-
ment under Article 3 can be determined only by reading sections 
25-3-104 through 25-3-112 as a unit. Also, sections 25-3-113 
(seal), 25-3-114 (date, antedating, postdating), and 25-3-119 (other 
writings affecting instrument) deal in part with the problem of 
whether a particular instrument is a "negotiable instrument within 
this article." 
Of special importance under subsection ( 1) (b) is the provision 
that any promise or order in addition to the basic promise or order 
to pay money will kill negotiability unless the additional promise 
or order is expressly approved by section 25-3-112 or other sections 
in Article 3. Thus, as will be noted when section 25-3-112 is com-
mented upon, the Code takes an "exclusive" approach to the ques-
tion of what additional matters may be included in an instrument 
without killing its negotiability. 
Section 25-3-105. When Promise or Order Unconditional.-
Two of the salutary changes of this section are: 
(a) Subsection (1) (g), which permits instruments of govern-
mental units to be limited to payment from a particular fund or 
16 As noted earlier, G.S. § 25-3-805 permits instruments lacking the 
words 11order" or 11bearer" to be governed by Article 3, except that there 
can be no holder in due course. 
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7 (1953). 
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source without losing their status as negotiable instruments. Usual-
ly, obligations of governmental units will be classified as investment 
securities coming under Article 8; however, some limited-source 
obligations may come under Article 3 as negotiable instruments. 
(b) Subsection (1) (h), which states that an instrument is not 
rendered non-negotiable merely because it is limited to payment 
from the entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, 
trust or estate by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued. 
Previously it was doubtful that such instruments were negotiable, 
because they were limited to payment from a particular fund. 
Section 2"3-3-106. Sum Certain.-Perhaps the most significant 
aspect of this section is its recognition that an instrument may be 
negotiable even though it provides for the payment of (a) costs of 
collection and (b) an attorney's fee upon a default in payment. 
This is really nothing new because General Statutes section 25-8 ( 5), 
which it replaces, also recognized that such provisions did not kill 
negotiability. However, the really interesting question is whether 
such reasonable agreements will be enforced.18 
It is submitted that, in the absence of a clear statutory prohibi-
tion, such contractual terms should be enforceable. In North Caro-
lina, however, prior to the Code there was a prohibition that "a 
provision incorporated in the instrument to pay counsel fees for col-
lection is not enforceable .... "19 However, these prohibitory words 
will not be a part of North Carolina law after the NIL becomes 
inoperative on July 1, 1967. 
This writer's suggestion to the North Carolina Legislative 
Council in preparing the study of Article 3 was that a statute similar 
to General Statutes section 6-21 be passed to permit attorney's fees 
to be collected as a part of costs in suits on negotiable instruments 
even though the paper did not contain an express clause permitting 
such fees to be collected by the holder.20 If such a statute were 
passed, most surely many persons would start honoring their bad 
notes and checks. Word would soon get around that a holder could 
afford to pay a lawyer to help him collect on paper that, in theory 
18 G.S. § 25-3-106(2) takes no position on the matter. 
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 (1953). 
•• Attorney's. fees are now allowed in certain cases. See generally N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 6-21 (1965), 6-21.1 (1963), 28-170.1 (1957), and 50-16 
(1955). See also 38 N.C.L. REv. 16 (1960) on attorney's fees as a part of 
costs. 
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at least, is supposed to be a substitute for money. Such unpaid 
obligations should be collectible at face value. 
Although the 1965 General Assembly did not take action to 
permit the collection of attorney's fees in all suits on negotiable 
instruments, this inaction does not necessarily affect collection of 
attorney's fees when they are specifically contracted for. There is 
some dictum in Queen City Coach Co. v. Lumberton Coach Co.21 
implying that attorney's fees may be collected when contracted for. 
And in the absence of any express statutory prohibition after the 
repeal of General Statutes section 25-8, there is some reason to 
believe that a contract for attorney's fees will be honored by the 
courts. 
Section 25-2-109. Definite Time.-A troublesome problem un-
der NIL section 422 was whether a note payable at a time certain 
but subject to an acceleration clause was payable at a determinable 
future time as required by the NIL. Some of the cases involved 
acceleration clauses permitting a holder to accelerate at his will, 
and the courts occasionally held that such acceleration clauses made 
the time uncertain; thus the instrument was non-negotiable. 
By this faulty "non-negotiable" reasoning, the courts attempted 
to protect the maker of the instrument who had contracted for an 
acceleration clause that was harsh to him. Better reasoned decisions, 
however, took the view that the note was still negotiable, but that 
the harsh acceleration clause should not be enforced. 
By amendment of NIL section 4 North Carolina permitted an 
acceleration clause. The amendment added: "But an instrument 
payable at a determinable future time is negotiable, even though it 
may mature or be declared due upon a contingency happening be-
fore such future time."23 A similar provision is found in subsection 
( 1 ) (c) of section 25-3-109. 
The amendment to NIL section 4 did not specify the effect of 
a clause that gave the holder a capricious option to accelerate, and 
there are no North Carolina cases on this matter. 
The capricious option problem now is solved, however, by sec-
tion 25-1-208, which provides that clauses permitting a holder to 
g1 229 N.C. 534, 50 S.E.2d 288 (1948). There the court said attorney's 
fees will not be allowed "in the absence of express agreement." I d. at 536, 
50 S.E.2d at 289. 
gg N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-10 (1953). 
go Ibid. 
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accelerate "at will," etc., will be enforced only when he acts in 
"good faith." Thus, under the Code the question of "negotiability" 
is separated from the independent question of "enforceability." 
As explained in the official comment, subsection 25-3-109(2) 
makes an important change by excluding from the operation of 
Article 3 those instruments that are payable on the happening of 
a certain event the time of which is uncertain.24 F.-or example, an 
instrument payable at the death of an individual (or at the end of 
a war, etc.) will not be a "negotiable instrument within this article," 
for the official comment strongly states that instruments payable at 
such uncertain times are not fit to be ordinary commercial paper. 
Section 25-3-110. Payable to Order.-There are no important 
North Carolina cases on this matter, and no real change is made in 
existing law. 
Section 25-3-111. Payable to Bearer.-The only important 
North Carolina decisions relating to bearer paper concern the "ficti-
tious payee" problem. Further comment is made on this matter in 
discussion of section 25-3-405. 
Section 25-3-112. Terms and Omissions Not Affecting N ego-
tiability.-This important section sets forth the "extras" or the 
so-called "permissive luggage," that may be included in an instru-
ment without killing negotiability. Subsection (2) provides, how-
ever, that the section itself does not validate any of these. 
It is important to note that the extras expressly permitted by 
this and other sections are the only extras that can be safely in-
cluded. If a p~ovision not expressly approved is included, the paper 
is not a "negotiable instrument within this article," even though 
fair-minded judges and businessmen might agree that such a clause 
was a useful addition to commercial paper. In substance, Article 
3 takes the "exclusive" view of permissive luggage. 
As was observed above, the fact that a paper is not a "negotiable 
instrument within this article" does not necessarily preclude the 
paper from being a negotiable instrument by other statutes or by 
decisions. This possibility must not be overlooked when the instru-
ment in question looks negotiable but does not quite meet the defini-
tion of section 25-3-104. 
A few states have seen fit to expand the list of permissives in 
Code section 3-112. For example, California and Virginia have 
2
' G.S. § 25-3-109, comment 1. 
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added to subsection ( 1) (c) language permitting a promise or a 
power "to furnish financial information or to do or refrain from 
doing any other act for the protection of the obligations expressed 
in the instrument not involving the payment of money on account 
of the indebtedness evidenced by the instrument .... "25 This modi-
fication was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board in 1962 
for the reason that "it would not only move substantially away 
from the 'courier without luggage' principle, but, in addition, could 
produce substantial confusion and litigation."26 The difference of 
opinion on this matter is one of many instances where nonuniform 
law has already been produced under the Code. 
Subsection 25-3-112 ( 1) (d) permitting a confession of judgment 
clause is of special interest. First, the clause is harmless only if 
it permits a confession after the instrument is overdue. A clause 
authorizing a confession before the instrument is due probably 
would kill negotiability. 
Of related interest is the fact that North Carolina apparently 
does not authorize an actual confession of judgment by the holder 
of a note.27 Even though the holder may not be able to confess 
judgment against the maker in North Carolina, the clause can be 
of use if enforcement is sought in a state that does enforce such 
clauses. 
Section 25-3-113. Seal.-One problem resolved by this section 
involves the question whether the donor of a sealed negotiable in-
strument can plead the defense of "want of consideration" when 
sued by the donee. There is no North Carolina case exactly on this 
point, but there is much dicta to the effect that a seal imports a 
consideration. 
The purpose of section 25-3-113 is to make all negotiable instru-
ments alike, seal or no seal, as far as defenses are concerned, and 
"want and failure of consideration" are defenses against a non-
HDC under section 25-3-306 (c). Thus, a donor would have a 
defense against his donee in a suit on a sealed negotiable instrument, 
2° CAL. Co:r.r:r.r. ConE § 3112(1)(c) (1964); VA. ConE § 8.3-112(1)(c) 
(1964). 
20 1 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, UCC REP. 73 (1963). New York 
had the same language as California and Virginia in its original version of 
this section but took it out of the section by amendment in 1963. N.Y. 
Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1003, § 5. 
27 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-247 to -249 (1953) (confession of judg-
ment). 
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even though he might not have such defense in a suit on a sealed 
non-negotiable instrument. 
The statute of limitations on a negotiable instrument under seal 
will continue to be ten years for suits against the principal obligor. 
Note that the ten-year period of General Statutes section 1-47 ap-
plies only to an action against the principal to the sealed instrument. 
Section 25-3-115. Incomplete Instruments.-This section makes 
some changes in prior law. One change is a reversal of the rule of 
NIL section 15,28 which provided that an incomplete undelivered 
instrument could not be enforced even by an HDC. Under subsec-
tion 25-3-115 (2) an HDC can enforce an instrument even though 
there has been no technical delivery by the maker or drawer. 
Basically, the problem of unauthorized completions (whether of 
delivered or undelivered paper) is covered by section 25-3-407 on 
material alteration. 
Section 25-3-116. Instruments Payable to Two or More Per-
sons.-This section in effect says that if the instrument is payable 
to "A or B", either tpay negotiate, enforce or discharge it. If the 
instrument is payable to "A and B", both must indorse in order to 
negotiate it. However, since one may be authorized to sign for 
the other, one person may make both signatures. Nevertheless, it 
seems that even when one party is fully authorized to deal with the 
instrument, there can be no technical negotiation unless both names 
actually appear as indorsements. 
Section 25-3-119. Other Writings Affecting Instrument.-This 
section permits collateral written agreements to modify the terms 
of a negotiable instrument. It does not purport to cover what parol 
evidence may be introduced to modify the instrument. Hopefully, 
the odd rule of Brown v. Osteen29 may be changed by this section. 
The Brown case held that notes containing no acceleration clause 
could not be recovered on before their stated maturity even though 
a contemporaneous mortgage securing the notes clearly stated that 
"a failure to pay any part of the interest, or any note or any part 
thereof, when due, shall mature all the indebtedness secured by the 
mortgage." 
As noted in the official comment,30 if the provision of the col-
lateral agreement relates only to acceleration for time of sale of 
•• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953). 
••197 N.C. 305, 148 S.E. 434 (1929). 
80 G.S. § 25-3-119, comment 3. 
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security and does not state that the basic obligation in the notes is 
accelerated, then the only acceleration will be of the sale of security. 
In the Brown case, however, the contemporaneous agreement in the 
mortgage also clearly covered acceleration of the notes, and the 
agreement could be given effect under this new section. 
Section 25-3-121. Instrummts Payable at a Bank.-This is one 
of many sections in the Code in which alternatives have been af-
forded the states without threatening the goal of uniformity. North 
Carolina chose Alternative B, which adopts the view that the pro-
vision that an instrument is payable at a named bank is neither an 
order nor an authorization to the bank to pay the instrument. 
Alternative A takes the position that when a note or an accep-
tance is payable at a named bank, this is the equivalent of an order 
on such bank to pay the instrument. Under this "Northeastern" 
view, the bank should pay its depositor's instrument when the bank 
is the place of payment. 
Virginia has adopted a compromise approach. In Virginia a 
provision that a note be payable at a bank is not per se an order 
to the bank to pay it from the maker's deposits, but "the bank may 
consider it an authorization to pay."31 
There is some merit to the Virginia approach. For example, if 
a bank's depositor has made a note payable at the bank, and the 
bank has been unable to receive instructions on whether the cus-
tomer wishes to have such note paid from his accounts, the bank is 
not under a duty to pay. However, it may safely pay the instru-
ment if it believes that the customer would prefer this to a dishonor. 
Section 25-3-122. Accrual of Cause of Acti01t; Interest.-This 
is an entirely new section, and in general it poses no special prob-
lems. Subsection ( 3), however, may have some unintended results. 
At least it warrants the careful consideration of lawyers. 
Subsection ( 3) states : "A cause of action against a drawer of 
a draft or an indorser of any instrument accrues upon demand 
following dishonor of the instrument. Notice of dishonor is a de-
mand."32 As is noted in the North Carolina comment on section 
25-3-122, there is a possibility that the holder of an instrument is 
given a power to determine when the period of limitations begins 
to run against him. Surely, this is not a sound rule. 
01 VA. ConE § 8.3-21 ( 1964). 
02 Emphasis added. 
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II. TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 
Section 25-3-201. Transfer; Right of Indorsemmt.-The sec-
tion recognizes that a negotiation is not the only way that rights in 
a negotiable instrument can be transferred. Any transfer vests in 
the transferee such rights as the transferor had therein. There is 
a proviso, however, that prohibits a reacquirer from improving 
his position by taking from a later HDC if the reacquirer was a 
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or if as a 
prior holder he had notice of a defens·e or claim against the instru-
ment. In substance, a bad faith prior holder cannot give the instru-
ment an "immunity bath" by passing it through a later HDC. Such 
a reacquirer is said to "stand in his old dirty shoes." There were 
some decisions under the NIL that permitted one having knowledge 
of fraud in the original transaction (but not participating in it) 
who transferred to an HDC and then reacquired the paper to have 
the status of an HDC.33 
Subsection (3) grants to the transferee of unindorsed "order 
paper" the right to the unqualified indorsement of his transferor, 
provided value has been given and there is no agreement that the 
transferee is not entitled such indorsement. Also, until the trans-
feree obtains the indorsement of "order paper," he is not a holder, 
and consequently he cannot be an HDC. The time at which his 
status as an HDC will be tested is the time that the transferee final-
ly obtains the indorsement. For this reason, an originally innocent 
purchaser prior to maturity may lose his ability to become an HDC 
if he acquires knowledge of a defense between the date of purchase 
and the date of the later indorsement. 
Section 25-3-202. N egotiation.-Because this is a key section, 
the full text should be studied carefully. 
Subsection ( 4) clarifies a sometimes worrisome matter. When 
words such as "I assign this note" were added to the signature 
on the back of· a negotiable instrument, it was at times difficult 
for the courts to interpret their exact meaning. Did they mean that 
the transfer was a mere assignment, rather than a negotiation? If 
so, there was no "holder" and no HDC. Did the word "assign" 
mean that the indorser was limiting his warranties to those of a 
mere assignor or qualified indorser, rather than extending his war-
•• See G.S. § 25-3-201, comment 3(e). 
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ran ties to those of an unqualified indorser ?34 Under subsection ( 4) 
the transfer of title is clear,. but additional words may operate to 
limit the transferor's liability. 
Section 25-3-204. Special Indorsement; Blank Indorsement.-
Under NIL section 3336 there were four general categories of in-
dorsement: ( 1) special or blank,36 (2) qualified or unqualified,37 
( 3) conditional or unconditional, 38 and ( 4) restrictive or nonre-
strictive.30 
To describe fully any single indorsement, one term from each of 
the four categories should be used because each deals with a differ-
ent legal effect. Under the Code, special and blank indorsements 
are covered by section Z5-3-204. Restrictive and nonrestrictive are 
covered by the following two sections. Coverage of conditional in-
dorsements is merged into the sections on restrictive indorsements 
without any major change. Qualified indorsements are now covered 
under "without recourse" provisions of sections 25-2-414( 1) and 
25-3-417 ( 3) .. 
Section 25-3-205. Restrictive lndorsements.-Perhaps the big-
gest change here is subsection (c), which states that restrictive 
indorsements include those that contain words like "for collection," 
"for deposit," "pay any bank or banker," or other terms signifying 
a purpose of deposit or collection. Under the NIL there was con-
siderable difference of opinion as to the effect of these words. 
Section 25-3-206. Effect of Restrictive Indorsement.-This sec-
tion completely revises the NIL, and the official comments should 
be examined carefully. Generally, the section lessens the restric-
tions of a restrictive indorsement. 
Subsection ( 1) reverses the NIL rule that "Pay A only'' or 
similar words would prevent a further negotiation. Under the new 
provisions, an instrument ·may be further negotiated despite the 
presence of such words in the indorsement. 
Subsection ( 3) changes NIL section 39 by permitting an in-
u Evans v. Freeman, 142 N.C. 70, 54 S.E. 847 (1906), held that an 
indorsement with the added words, "I assign all my right, title and interest," 
was an unqualified indorsement. 
85 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-39 (1953) . 
•• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-40 (1953). 
DT N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-44 (1953). 
DB N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-45 (1953). 
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-42 (1953). 
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dorsee under a restrictive indorsement to be an HDC free of the 
indorser's claim if certain requirements are met. 
Section 25-3-207. Negotiation Effective Although It May Be 
Rescinded.-Basically, this section helps to expand the negotiability 
of instruments. For example, subsection ( 1) permits a negotiation 
to be effective even though (a) made by a person without capacity, 
(b) there was fraud or _duress, (c) the negotiation was part of an 
illegal transaction, or (d) the negotiation was in breach of duty. 
Subsection (2) recognizes that the injured party may have some 
remedy against other parties, but not against an HDC. 
Section 25-3-208. Reacquisition.-The most important part of 
this section relates to the discharge of intervening parties after an 
instrument has been reacquired by a prior owner. The rights of the 
reacquirer himself were mentioned in the comment on section 25-3-
201. 
III. RIGHTS OF A HoLDER 
Section 25-3-301. Rights of a H older.-Hopefully, this section 
will legislatively overrule the opinion of First N at'l Bank v. Rocha-
mora, 40 which said that, because of the real-party-in-interest statute 
in North Carolina/1 an agent could not enforce an instrument of 
which he is the holder. This ruling, which was really not neces-
sary to the determination of the case, has plagued students, pro-
fessors, and practitioners for many years, and the Code should put 
it to rest. The latest expression of legislative intent is that any 
holder, whether he be agent or owner, may enforce payment in his 
own name. Of course, this does not mean that a mere agent will 
be free of defenses against the agent's principal. 
Section ZS-3-302. Holder in Due C ourse.-By a few clarifying 
additions this section somewhat broadens the tests for HDC status. 
For example, it is now made clear that a payee can be an HDC if 
he meets the usual tests. To obtain a full appreciation of the new 
provisions, this section should be considered in conjunction with 
section 25-3-303 (taking for value) and section 25-3-304 (notice 
to purchasers). 
A major change eliminates the requirement of NIL section 52 
that one must take an instrument "complete and regular on its 
•• 193 N.C. 1, 136 S.E. 259 (1927) (criticized in 5 N.C.L. REV. 369 
(1927) ). 
u N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953). 
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face" in order to be an HDC. Under the Code incompleteness and 
irregularity are considered only as a subdivision of the primary test 
of "notice." Also, subsection (2) specifically states that a payee 
may be an HDC. 
Section 25-3-303. Taking for Value.-One change, academic 
perhaps, makes it clear that in order for one to be an HDC, he must 
have himself given value. He cannot "tack" his own good faith to 
a prior holder's value. 
The troublesome problem of when bank credit is value is not 
covered by this section but is left to the more specific banking pro-
visions of section 25-4-209. 
Section 25-3-304. Notice to Purchaser.-The official comment 
on this significant section is extensive and should be considered in 
any analysis of the subject. 
One significant change relates to the previously mentioned "com-
plete and regular" requirement for HDC status. Under subsection 
( 1) (a), incompleteness will give notice of a claim or defense only 
if the instrument is "so incomplete" as to raise a question about its 
validity. Though this liberalizing language may produce increased 
litigation, minor omissions are no longer death to HDC standing. 
There appears to be some conflict between subsection (2) cover-
ing the consequences of taking from a fiduciary and certain sections 
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.42 
Section 25-3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course.-Covered 
by this section are the rights of both an HDC in his own right and 
one who is a derivative HDC under section 25-3-201. 
An important change is made to the rule of NIL section 15,43 
which did not permit an HDC to recover from one who had signed 
incomplete and undelivered paper. Now, however, if such paper 
is stolen and negotiated to an HDC, the HDC can -recover. Thus, 
the liability of one who signs such paper is increased. 
Even an HDC is subject to certain so-called "real defenses"; 
and these are listed in subsection (2). 
Section 25-3-306. Rights of One Not a Holder in Due Course . 
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-5 to -7 (1950). The official comments, however, 
declare that the Code follows the policy of this act. G.S. § 25-3-305, com-
ment 5. 
u N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953). 
1966] COMMERCIAL PAPER 617-
-Basically, the rules are about the same as under the NIL and the 
North Carolina decisions. 
Section 25-3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures, Defenses 
and Due C ourse.-Here the rules of procedure are simplified by 
omitting some of the fictitional "presumptions" that were used under 
the NIL. The official comment44 notes that one who is not a holder, 
but who is in possession of the instrument, must prove his right 
to it and must account for the absence of any indorsement. 
IV. LIABILITY OF pARTIES 
The nineteen sections of this part set forth the liabilities of 
various parties to the instrument. Sections 25-3-401 through 25-
3-406 are on signatures. The provisions of section 25-3-407 on 
alterations to the instrument are especially important. 
Section 25-3-403. Signature by Authorized Representative.-
Subsection ( 1) permits a party's name to be signed by another 
when authorized. The person whose name is so signed becomes 
liable on the instrument. Subsection (2) (a) makes an authorized 
representative personally liable when neither his representative 
capacity nor the name of his principal appears on the instrument. 
Also, a representative runs a risk of personal liability under sub-
section (2) (b) when only one of these appears on the instrument. 
Thus there is danger in not revealing the name of a principal. This 
risk is accentuated when it is remembered that the principal whose 
name is not on the instrument is not "liable on the instrument" 
under section 25-3-401 ( 1). 
Section 25-3-404. Unauthorized Signatures.-Under this sec-
tion an unauthorized signature is generally not operative as the 
signature of the person whose name appears. However, it is opera-
tive as the signature of the person who makes the unauthorized 
signature. Furthermore, one whose signature has been wrongfully 
made may ratify such signature or he may be precluded from deny-
ing that it is authorized. · 
Because the question of authorization is a matter not appearing 
on the face of the instrument, suit on a possibly unauthorized signa~ 
ture should include as defendants both the party who did the sign-
ing and the party whose name was signed. 
Section 25-3-405. Imposters; Signature in Name of Payee.-
•• G.S. § 25-3-307, comment 2. 
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This section codifies the better decisions relating to "imposters" 
and "payroll padders." Under the NIL, these problems were solved 
usually by the fiction of the "fictitious payee doctrine." By this 
certain instruments payable to the order of persons not intended to 
have any interest in the instrument were classified as "bearer" paper, 
which could be negotiated by a delivery alone without the indorse-
ment of the named payee who was not intended to have any interest 
in the item. 
Under the Code, the drawer or maker of a note who has let him-
self be swindled out of an instrument by an imposter or a defraud-
ing payroll clerk will still bear the loss as against his drawee or an 
innocent purchaser, but the technique to produce this proper result 
is different. Under the new technique: 
( 1) an instrument issued in the name of a payee not intended 
to have an interest does not become mere bearer paper; 
(2) a purportedly regular indorsement is required; 
(3) however, any person may indorse in the name of the named 
payee. 
Since the section is limited to the signatures of "payees," there 
may be some question of its applicability when the imposter has 
the sucker indorse a paper to him pretending that it is for an 
indorsee not intended to have any interest in the item. The follow-
ing section may cover this problem. 
Section 25-3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Un-
authorized Signature.-The long-recognized effect of negligence is 
hereby codified. Nate that this section differs from the prior one 
in which negligence is not required in order to charge the defrauded 
party. Nate, also, that the liability here is not in tort but on the 
instrument by the "precluded" theory. Can a party damaged by 
the negligence of another also sue in tort? Such may be the only 
remedy of a bona fide purchaser who does not quite meet the techni-
cal definition of an HDC. 
Section 25-3-407. Alteration.-. The official comment to this im-
portant section should be studied to appreciate fully its coverage. 
Basically, it combines in one section the former rules of incomplete 
instruments45 and materially altered instruments.46 
The old rule which did not make liable the signer of an incom-
·~ N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-20 (1953). 
40 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-131 (1953). 
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plete and undelivered instrument47 has been reversed. The signer 
of such paper is now liable on the instrument. 
Section 25-3-408. C onsideration.-Like the NIL, Article 3 con-
tinues to distinguish consideration and value. Consideration is con-
cerned with what the obligor received, and it pertains to whether 
he has a defense of lack of consideration. By contrast, value per-
tains to what a purchaser has given in order to be a taker ror value. 
Value is the element required for HDC status. No major change 
is made in North Carolina law. 
Section 25-3-409. Draft Not an Assignment.-This continues 
the prior rule that a check or other draft does not per se operate as 
an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee ;48 and the 
drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it. 
Section 25-3-410. Definition and Operation of Acceptance.-
Probably the most important change is that all acceptances must be 
on the instrument. Under the prior law49 an acceptance could be on 
a separate paper. 
Though an acceptance must be on the draft, the section is not 
intended to eliminate the liability of a drawee in contract, in tort or 
otherwise arising from a separate writing or from any other obliga-
tion or representation. 
Subsection ( 1) eliminates the provisions of NIL section 13760 
on constructive acceptance when the drawee destroys the instrument 
or refuses to return it within twenty-four hours after receipt. How-
ever, under section 25-3-419, the drawee is liable for conversion. 
Section 25-3-411. Certification of a Check.-Subsection ( 1) 
continues the rule of NIL section 18851 that the obtaining of certifi-
cation of a check by the drawer leaves him liable as a secondary 
party, while the obtaining of certification by a holder discharges the 
drawer and all prior indorsers. 
Section 25-3-412. Acceptance Varying Draft.-Drawees do not 
often accept in a manner that varies the draft, but there are a few 
changes from prior law not justifying comment here. 
Section 25-3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor.-
N o real change in substance is made, but the section should be 
•• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-21 (1953). 
•• See 13 N.C.L. REv. 131 (1934) and 31 N.C.L. REv. 190 (1953) as to 
what constitutes an assignment . 
•• N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-141, -142 (1953). 
GO N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-144 (1953). 
01 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-196 (1953). 
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read in conjunction with other sections cited in the official comment. 
Section 25-3-414. Contract of Indorser; Order of Liability.-
The contract of an indorser is to pay the instrument if there is a 
dishonor and if any necessary notice and protest are properly made. 
This contractual obligation attaches whether or not the indorser is 
also a transferor. If, as is usual, the indorser is also a transferor, 
he is subject to the warranty obligations of section 25-3-417 cover-
ing "warranties on presentment and transfer." Thus, this section 
and section 25-3-417 must be read together to determine the full 
liability of the typical transferor-indorser. 
A transferor-indorser may eliminate his contract to pay by in-
dorsing "without recourse" or by otherwise indicating that he does 
not agree to pay the instrument. Furthermore, by use of the words 
"without recourse," the transferor can also slightly limit his war-
ranties under section 25-3-417 ( 3). 
Section 25-3-415. Contract of Accommodation Party.-As un-
der existing law, an accommodation party is liable on the instrument 
even though he receives no consideration and even though he is 
known to be a mere accommodation party. He is not liable, how-
ever, to the party being accommodated, and if he pays the instru-
ment, he is given a right of recourse on the instrument against such 
accommodated party. 
Section 25-3-416. Contract of Guarantor.-This new section 
states the usual commercial rule that one who adds words of guaran-
ty to his signature is immediately liable upon default in payment, and 
the holder need not resort to any other party. Some change may 
be made from prior North Carolina decisions on the question of 
whether presentment was necessary to charge a surety or a guaran-
tor.112 
It is submitted that this section should not supersede the pro-
visions of General Statutes section 26-7 permitting a guarantor to 
request a creditor to take diligent action against the principal, with 
the requesting guarantor's being discharged to the extent he is 
prejudiced if the creditor refuses or fails to take action. 53 
Section 25-3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.-
Here certain warranties are thrust upon one who transfers an instru-
ment or presents it for payment. As previously noted in the com-
•• See Rouse v. Wooten, 140 N.C. 557, 53 S.E. 430 (1906); Dry v. 
Reynolds, 205 N.C. 571, 172 S.E. 351 (1934) . 
•• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 26-9 (1953). 
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ment on section 25-3-414, the warranties of a transferor can be 
slightly limited by use of the words "without recourse." By using 
such words, the transferor eliminates his warranty that there are 
no defenses against him and merely warrants that he knows of no 
such defenses. 
Closely related to this section is section 25-4-207 governing the 
warranties of a customer and a collecting hank on the transfer or 
presentment of claims in the bank collection process. 
Section 25-3-418. Finality of Payment and Acceptance.-Basi-
cally, this restatement of prior rules follows the rule of the leading 
case of Price v. Neal, 54 which decided that when a drawee pays an 
instrument containing the forged name of the drawer, the drawee 
cannot recover back the money from the recipient of the funds. As 
the great exception to the usual rule that money paid by mistake 
can be recovered, the decision is justified on the grounds that the 
mistake is primarily that of the drawee, who is in a superior position 
to know the drawer's signature. 
The section clearly states that payment is final only when made 
to an HDC or a person who has in good faith changed his position 
in reliance on the payment. This may be a change from prior law. 
Section 25-3-419. Conversion of the Instrument; Innocent Rep-
resentation.-A party who refuses to return an instrument is liable 
as a convertor for the face amount of the instrument. Thus, the 
liability of a wrongdoing drawee will be the same as if there had 
been a constructive acceptance under prior law. Constructive ac-
ceptance has been eliminated under section 25-3-410. Again, we see 
about the same results, but technically different reasoning. 
V. PRESENTMENT, NoTICE OF DISHONOR, AND PROTEST 
The eleven sections in this part deal with the details of the 
conditions precedent to the liability of secondary parties (usually 
drawers and indorsers). Though there has been a considerable 
streamlining of prior law, there are few fundamental changes. Gen-
erally, Part 5 eliminates some of the technicalities of presentment, 
notice of dishonor and protest, and it simplifies others. 
Section 25-3-501. When Presentment, Notice of Dishonor, and 
Protest Necessary or Permissible-Though presentment, notice of 
dishonor and protest are usually necessary to charge a secondary 
•• 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). 
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party, they may be excused. This section states when they are 
necessary, and section 25-3-511 indicates when they are excused. 
One of the interesting aspects of this section is that it broadens 
the class of secondary parties to include some parties not usually 
thought of as being in this class. Typically, drawers and indorsers 
are the only secondary parties whose liability is conditional on 
timely presentment, notice of dishonor and protest. However, be-
cause instruments payable at a bank are in many jurisdictions the 
equivalent of an order to the bank,55 some parties normally con-
sidered as primary parties are shifted to secondary status. 
For example, consider the maker of a note or the acceptor of a 
draft. Normally, these parties have contracted "to pay," not to "pay 
if someone else does not." Thus, they are usually so-called primary 
parties. If, however, the note or the accepted draft is payable at a 
bank, section 25-3-121 comes into play. And under Alternative A, 
adopted in many states, such an instrument becomes the equivalent 
of a draft or order to the bank to pay the instrument from funds 
of the maker or acceptor.56 
Since, the instrument payable at the bank is the equivalent of 
a draft, the maker or acceptor now occupies the position of a mere 
secondary party. Consequently, section 25-3-501 provides that pre-
sentment for payment and notice of dishonor are necessary in order 
to charge "the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank or the maker 
of a note payable at a bank." 
Does this rule apply in North Carolina even though the state 
has rejected Alternative A and has adopted Alternative B stating 
that the provision that the instrument is payable at a bank does not 
amount to an order or an authorization to pay? The answer to 
this question is found, not in section 25-3-501, but in subsection 
25-3-511 ( 2) which provides : 
Presentment or notice or protest as the case may be is entirely 
excused when 
(b) such party has himself dishonored the instrument or has 
countermanded payment or otherwise has no reason to expect or 
right to require that the instrument be accepted or paid. . . . 
Because an instrument payable at a bank is not an order to the 
bank under the North Carolina version of Code section 3-121, any 
•a See G.S. § 25-3-121, N.C. comment. 
•o See discussion of G.S. § 25-3-121 sttpra. 
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dishonor will be by the maker or the acceptor, and the above-quoted 
"entirely excused" clause will apply. 
Section 25-3-502. Unexcused Delay; Discharge.-Certain sec-
ondary parties are discharged by unexcused delay in presentment 
and notice of dishonor. An indorser is fully discharged, but a 
drawer, the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank, and the maker 
of a note payable at a bank are discharged only in special situations 
as provided by subsection ( 1) (b). Also, failure to make a neces-
sary protest will discharge a drawer or an indorser. 
Section 25-3-503. Time of Presentment.-In addition to general 
time provisions, the section contains two new provisions giving 
specific times within which presentment of an uncertified check must 
be made. Subsections (2) (a) and (2) (b) provide that, as against 
a drawer of an uncertified check, presentment must be made within 
thirty days after date of issue or stated date, whichever is later; 
against an indorser, presentment must be made within seven days 
after his indorsement. Since late presentment grants a full discharge 
to an indorser under the preceding section, the holder of an un-
certified check must make a prompt presentment to hold the indorser. 
Section 25-3-504. How Presentment Made.-The rules on the 
methods of presentment are here simplified. If an item is to be 
collected through the banking process, section 25-4-210 should also 
be consulted. 
Section 25-3-505. Rights of the Party to Whom Presentment 
Is Made.-This expanded and modified version of NIL section 74 
should be read in conjunction with section 25-3-804 (lost, de-
stroyed or stolen instruments). Clearly, such instruments cannot be 
presented in the usual manner, and since one of the presentee's 
rights is exhibition of the instrument, the owner of a lost or de-
stroyed instrument may be forced to bring action as provided for 
in section 25-3-804. 
Section 25-3-506. Time Allowed For Acceptance or Payment. 
-The person to whom presentment is made for acceptance usually 
has until the close of the next business day after presentment to 
decide what he will do. When an item is presented for payment, 
payment must be made by the end of the business day on which 
presentment is made; otherwise there is a dishonor. If presentment 
is made to a bank, the deferred posting provisions of section 25-4-
301 will modify the terms of this section. 
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Section 25-3-509. Protest; Noting For Protest.-The mechanics 
of protest are simplified. Also, protest is not required except. on 
drafts drawn or payable outside of the United States. 57 
Section 25-3-511. Waiver and Excused Presentment, Protest 
or Notice of Dishonor or Delay Therein.-Here in one section are 
combined many rambling provisions of the NIL. In reading the 
section, it is important to distinguish between uexcused" and uen-
tirely excused." In commercial practice, this section will be quite 
important, and a careful study is suggested. When a client has not 
made the normal presentment and notice of dishonor, this section 
may keep him from having inadvertently granted discharges to 
other parties. 
VI. DISCHARGE 
The six sections of this part provides several methods by which 
the various parties to a negotiable instrument are discharged from 
liability on the instrument or other than on the instrument. 
Section 25-3-601. Discharge Of Parties.-Throughout Article 
3 are scattered sections dealing with the discharge of a party from 
liability on the instrument. Subsection ( 1) of this section contains 
a convenient index to these other provisions. 
Section 25-3-602. Effect of Discharge Against Holder in Due 
C ourse.-While a holder may be an HDC under section 25-3-
304(1) (b) even when he knows of the discharge of some parties, 
this section in a negative sort of way provides that the HDC can-
not hold such parties liable. 
Section 25-3-603. Payment or Satisfaction.-Subsection ( 1) 
changes existing law by eliminating the requirement of NIL sec-
tion 8868 that a payor is discharged by payment only if he ·makes 
payment at a time when he does not know of adverse claims to the 
instrument. The payor now is relieved of worrying about other 
partie:;' squabbles uqless the claimant supplies adequate indemnity 
to the payor, or the ~laimant enjoj1;1s pp.ymeqt._ Thqs, ~}:1~ burden of 
taking action to prevent payment is plac.ed on the adverse cl~im~t. 
In two situations, howeye~, a payor will not be discharged ~h_e~ 
he makes a payment, ev_en though he has not been inderimified or 
enjoined: 
"
7 Thus the inland-foreign bill of exchange distinction dies. See NIL § 
129, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-136 (1953) . 
•• N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-95 (1953). 
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(a) when he in bad faith pays one who has taken through a 
thief (unless the taker has the rights of an HDC) ; or 
(b) when he pays contrary to the terms of a restrictive in-
dorsement. 
Subsection (2) permits a stranger to pay an instrument with 
the consent of the holder, and the person who so pays will be given 
the rights of a transferee when the instrument is surrendered to 
him; There seems to be no sound reason for not affording the same 
privilege to one who pays with the consent of the owner, even 
though the owner may not be a holder. 
Section 25-3-604. Tender of Payment.-Subsection (1) is a 
new provision partially discharging one who makes full tender. Such 
a party is discharged of all subsequent liability for interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees. 
Section 25-3-605. Cancellatio11, and Renunciation.-This section 
apparently will continue the rule of Page Trust Co. v. Lewis159 that 
a verbal renunciation is ineffectual. A renunciation must be in 
writing. 
Section 25-3-606. Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral.-By 
this section a holder may discharge secondary parties when without 
the parties' consent the holder releases his rights against certain 
persons or property. However, the holder may preserve certain rights 
by an express reservation of these rights. There seems to be no 
good reason for limiting these rules to holders. 
VII. MISCELLANEOUS 
Of the five sections in Part 8, all but the first are new provisions 
not found in the NIL. They restate in code form rules that have 
developed by decision alone or by legislation other than the N-IL. 
Section 25-3-801. Drafts in a Set.-Drafts in a set are not 
widely used in domestic· commerce, and the matter does not justify 
summarization here. 
Section 25-3-802. Effect of Instrument on· Obligation. for which 
it is Given.-This important section probably changes some prior 
North Carolina case law. Under the new rules, if the item given 
in payment is an item drawn or accepted by a bank, such as a 
cashier's check or a certified check, the underlying obligor is dis-
•• 200 N.C. 286, 156 S.E. 504 (1931). 
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charged pro tanto on the underlying obligation, and he is not liable 
on the instrument if the bank fails to honor it. 
When any other instrument is given in payment, the under-
lying obligation is suspended60 pro tanto until the instrument is 
due. If the instrument is dishonored, action may be maintained 
either on the instrument or on the underlying obligation. The dis-
charge of an obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the 
underlying obligation. This probably means a pro tanto discharge. 
Section 25-3-803. Notice to Third Party.-This procedural sec-
tion permits a party defendant to give notice of a pending suit to 
any person that may be liable to the joined defendant. A full scale 
"vouching in" of parties defendant is not authorized. However a 
limited type of vouching in is approved to give the joined defendant 
the privilege of pleading res judicata on some issues in a later suit 
against the notified party. 
Section 25-3-804. Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instrument.-
There may be a good reason for limiting the right of recovery to 
the ow1ter, but there may be some reason to let a mere collection 
agent recover in order to protect himself and his principal. 
Section 25-3-805.-Instruments Not Payable to Order or Bear-
er.-As earlier noted, an instrument that has all of the attributes of 
a negotiable instrument within this article except that it lacks the 
words "order" or "bearer" will be subject to all of the rules of 
Article 3, except there can be no HDC.61 
CoNCLUSION 
Article 3 and its modernization of the NIL have not been a 
particularly controversial matter. Nearly everyone agrees that it 
does a reasonably good job of streamlining the law of commercial 
paper. Most of us will not have to unlearn too much, and research 
will be considerably simplified. 
00 See G.S. § 25-3-802, N.C. comment, for discussion of a possible 
ambiguity in the new "suspension" rule. 
01 See G.S. § 25-3-805, comment. 
